FIU Law Review
Volume 12

Number 2

Article 5

Spring 2017

Zoning and the Complicated Reliance on Restrictive Covenants
Dennis A. Kerbel
Miami-Dade County Attorney’s Office

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Dennis A. Kerbel, Zoning and the Complicated Reliance on Restrictive Covenants, 12 FIU L. Rev. 263
(2017).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.12.2.5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

02-KERBEL 5.9.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/17 6:15 PM

ZONING AND THE COMPLICATED RELIANCE ON RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
Dennis A. Kerbel, Esq.∗
INTRODUCTION
Zoning decisions remain among the most significant policy choices a
local government can make, as they can directly change the very character of
an area. Since the advent of Euclidean zoning,1 local zoning schemes have
divided a municipality into districts that segregate residential, business,
industrial, agricultural, and other categories of uses from each other.2 Once
∗ Dennis A. Kerbel is an Assistant County Attorney and the Chief of the Zoning, Land Use &
Environment Section of the Miami-Dade County Attorney’s Office. Dennis is a litigator who has
practiced in federal and state court, at both the trial and appellate levels. Dennis handles a broad
variety of cases, including challenges to County ordinances, appeals of land use decisions,
enforcement actions, and federal civil rights claims. In addition, Dennis is responsible for drafting
and review of ordinances, resolutions, and contracts. He also advises the Board of County
Commissioners and other County boards on public hearings involving land use matters. The views
expressed herein are his own.
1
Named, not for the mathematical system, but for Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), which gave constitutional approval to this type of regulation.
2
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394–95. The U.S. Supreme Court deferred to the determinations of
local legislatures that zoning ordinances were constitutional uses of the police power to protect “the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” and that the separation of a municipality into distinct
districts within which certain uses were prohibited was not “arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. at 395. The
Court specifically affirmed the exclusion of apartment buildings from single-family detached homes,
based on criteria that have been a staple of local zoning ordinances since then:
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of commissions
and experts, and the results of their investigations have been set forth in
comprehensive reports. These reports . . . concur in the view that the segregation
of residential, business and industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire
apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each
section; that it will increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tend to
prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and
resulting confusion in residential sections, decrease noise and other conditions
which produce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more favorable
environment in which to rear children, etc. With particular reference to apartment
houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is greatly
retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very
often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the
residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house
is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation
of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing
noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of
moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting
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the zoning scheme is established, a local government is generally obligated
to assign each parcel of land to one of these general zoning districts.3 The
strict division of a municipality into specific and distinct zones has
presented its own unique challenges, because the life of a city is not always
so easily divisible into boxes. Yet, the Florida Supreme Court has long
interpreted the (otherwise correct) prohibition on contracting away the
police power—referred to in this context as unlawful “contract zoning”4—
to also restrict a local government from imposing site-specific conditions
when reassigning the zoning district applicable to a property—referred to as
“conditional zoning” (or, more precisely, “conditional rezoning”).5
Consequently, zoning boards considering rezonings are generally
obligated to consider, not any one particular use that may be made of a
property, but rather the application of the proposed Euclidean district
generally. But zoning boards often want assurances as to what, exactly, they
are approving to be done on a property (albeit without running afoul of the
prohibition on direct control of property6). And zoning applicants, who need
regulatory approval to undertake their projects, want to assure the
respective zoning boards and the interested community members who
support or object to those projects that the applicants will adhere to the
representations they make to the public.
Over the last several decades, one common mechanism applicants have
used to address these issues, while avoiding the prohibition on contract
zoning and restrictions on conditional rezoning, has been to voluntarily
proffer a restrictive covenant (or declaration of restrictions—the terms are

from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces
for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities-until, finally, the residential
character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses,
which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but
highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances.
Id. at 394–95.
3 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d
700, 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1985).
4 See Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89 (“A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract
with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to various covenants and
restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner.”);
Chung v. Sarasota Cty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“Contract zoning” refers to an
agreement between a property owner and a local government where the owner agrees to certain
conditions in return for the government’s rezoning or enforceable promise to rezone.).
5 Zoning and rezoning decisions are distinguished from other zoning actions, such as variances,
conditional uses, and other exceptions, reviews, and interpretations of zoning ordinances. See infra Part
III.
6 See, e.g., Debes, 690 So. 2d at 702; Porpoise Point P’ship, 470 So. 2d at 851.
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used interchangeably) during a rezoning hearing.7 The covenant may be an
inducement to approve the rezoning, but because it is presented during the
zoning hearing itself and not in a separate proceeding, it does not represent
the illegal contracting away of the police power.8 And, because the
covenant is voluntarily imposed by the property owner, it is not a condition
of the rezoning. The covenant thereafter becomes part of the zoning
regulations governing the property.9
But, because covenants are rooted in law governing private property
transactions, they present challenges when used as regulatory zoning
instruments. Covenants may be enforced as local regulations, but they are
legal instruments to which the law also attaches unique theories of redress.
To be binding, covenants require certain formalities that do not apply to
other zoning regulations. For example, all property owners and mortgagees
must execute the instrument. In addition, depending on the terms of the
covenant, amending or deleting the covenant may require not only the
normal zoning hearing process, but also the approval of the parties who
created the covenant and any other parties who are given rights to
enforce the covenant. Such requirements may present unique challenges.
For example, if a covenant applies to property that is sold off into numerous
condominium units without granting a condominium association the
authority to approve modifications,10 then the local government’s approval
7 Local governments also have the option to adopt and apply new zoning ordinances––sometimes
referred to as “form-based codes”––that provide for mixed-use developments and do away with the strict
Euclidean districts. See, e.g., Code of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Ch. 33, art. XXXIII(I)–(V); Miami
21 Code, City of Miami. But, rewriting a local zoning code is a significant undertaking that requires
extensive use of professional resources and community hearings to determine the right mix of uses for
the subject area. See generally TERRY E. LEWIS ET AL., SPOT ZONING, CONTRACT ZONING, AND
CONDITIONAL ZONING, 2 FLA. ENVTL. & LAND USE L. 9-1 (1994) (“Conditional zoning is gaining
acceptance in Florida as a desirable means to ameliorate the rigidity of Euclidean zoning. . . . This
process employs tools such as impact and planned unit development zoning. With impact zoning,
development type and density are included in the zoning ordinance. Planning flexibility and creativity
are encouraged. Strict lot line, floor space, curb, gutter, and sideyard requirements are relaxed.”).
8 See, e.g., Walberg v. Metro. Dade County, 296 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
9 Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[T]he
duly imposed restrictive covenant in this case is a governmental regulation, rather than an estate,
interest, claim or charge affecting the marketability of the property’s title. . . .”), reh’g denied (June 6,
2016), review denied, SC16-1189, 2016 WL 7474142 (Fla. Dec. 29, 2016); Metro. Dade Cty. v.
Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007–08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (The County
Commission approved the rezoning of the property to a commercial district, but the zoning resolution
“clearly expressed that the county commission granted rezoning only for a bank or savings and loan and
accepted the property owner’s offer of a restrictive covenant and the county’s option to enforce this
restriction.”).
10 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163
(1999) (“[I]t may be easier for zoning regulators to allow more fragmentation later than for individuals
to turn the ratchet back and reassemble land.”); Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and
the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002) (noting the risks in use of conservation easements
because of the “nontrivial” expenditures that may arise in “reassembling fragmented property rights”).
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of the covenant release may not be sufficient to remove the restriction if the
covenant’s modification term requires the consent of all of the property
owners.
Given the complexities that zoning covenants present, it is time to
revisit the legal underpinnings of the system that restricted the use of
conditional rezonings, so that regulatory hearings before local government
boards do not become unnecessarily embroiled in ancillary issues
concerning ownership of real property.11
I.ZONING AND REZONING AS LEGISLATIVE ACTS
Local governments have the authority to enact zoning laws and
regulations under their “police power, asserted for the public welfare.”12
Traditional Euclidean zoning divides a municipality into general zoning
districts of varying intensities—for example, single-family residential,
multi-family residential (usually, apartments), neighborhood-serving
business, liberal business, light industrial, heavy industrial, agriculture—
and assigns each parcel of land to one of those districts. In earlier times, the
decision to zone or rezone a parcel was considered to be a legislative act,
and both the original enacting legislation and any subsequent rezoning
actions were reviewed under the “fairly debatable” standard.13
The leading case was the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953). Lachman concerned
owners of eighty-six lots whose application to rezone their beachfront
properties from a single-family residential district to a district that permitted
apartment houses and hotels had been denied.14 At that time, a challenge to

11
This article does not address development agreements adopted pursuant to the Florida Local
Government Development Agreement Act (sections 163.3220–163.3243, Florida Statutes).
12
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926); see also Forde v.
City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1941) (“[I]t is no longer questioned that a municipality,
acting under legislative authority, may be vested with the power to enact a valid zoning ordinance and
that a general attack thereon will ordinarily fail; nor is it questioned that the right of an urban owner to
the free use of his property may be regulated by a legitimate exercise of the police power, and when so
asserted, fairly and impartially in the interest of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, the
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the public officials duly authorized in the premises
unless it clearly appears that their action has no just foundation in reason and necessity [i.e., the ‘fairly
debatable’ rule].”).
13
City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152–53 (Fla. 1953) (“There is no showing
here of confiscation. It may or may not be that some owners will suffer a reduction in price if they sell
before the city in its discretion changes the zoning plan. After all, that is the matter of greatest
importance, and it is a debatable question. It cannot be solved by looking at one man’s property, but
must be resolved by a contemplation of the whole picture. So considered, we find no abuse of
discretion.”).
14
Id. at 149–50.
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a zoning decision was by original action; thus, the owners sued to enjoin the
city from enforcing the single-family residential zone on their properties. A
trial was held, evidence was produced, and the trial court determined that
the zoning ordinance “was unreasonable and not ‘fairly debatable.’” The
Florida Supreme Court looked principally to Village of Euclid to determine
the applicable standard of review for rezoning decisions and held, “An
ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason it is open
to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical
deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity.”15 This
standard is based on separation of powers principles, as the Court further
noted: “If such a deduction supports the city’s contention that to remove the
present zoning restrictions would destroy the entire zoning scheme and
bring about the evils contended by the city, then the Court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the City Council.”16
For the ensuing decades, rezoning decisions in Florida, whether by
ordinance or resolution, were considered to be legislative decisions. As
such, they were to be reviewed through the filing of “[s]uits in equity
seeking injunctive relief against a zoning ordinance or resolution on the
ground that it is arbitrary, capricious, confiscatory or impinges on some
right or guarantee of the Constitution of this State.”17 But, the adoption of
the rezoning ordinance was not subject to any more heightened standard or
procedure than the adoption of any other ordinance.18

15

Id. at 152.
Id.
17
Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (“It has been uniformly held in this
state that the function of a board or commission in the enactment of zoning ordinances is a purely
legislative function. The decisions on this subject dispel any contention that a zoning ordinance or
resolution is quasi-judicial in character.”) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami
Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959) (“It is obvious to us that the enactment of the original zoning
ordinance was a legislative function and we cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different
character.”); Palm Beach Cty. v. Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“[C]lassification
of lands under zoning ordinances involves the exercise of legislative power. Thus, the doctrine of
separation of powers prevents the courts from interfering with such exercise. Therefore, a court order
which directs the zoning authority to zone a property in a particular manner violates the separation of
powers doctrine.”); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
(“[T]he zoning authority’s decision should have been reviewed under the traditional ‘fairly debatable’
standard of review and . . . neither the comprehensive plan nor the proposed zoning ordinance supported
reversal below. . . . [T]he city produced evidence that its decision was related to the health, safety,
welfare and morals of the community and there was no competent evidence that plaintiff was deprived
of reasonable beneficial use of the property.”); Dade Cty. v. Markoe, 164 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 3d DCA
1964) (“The entire thrust of the petition is directed to the lack of authority in the commission to rescind,
by its second resolution, the first resolution which rezoned the property. The circuit court found, and we
think correctly, that the action of the commission in enacting the second resolution was legislative in
character. This being so, there was nothing to review, for only those decisions which have a judicial or
quasi-judicial character are subject, in [certiorari] proceedings . . . , to review.”).
18
The Florida Supreme Court would later recede from this principle and determine that
16
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The underlying premise of the Euclidean system is to prevent one
category of uses from encroaching on another, but the emphasis on general
categories restricts a local government’s ability to tailor a rezoning to the
unique features that may have developed in a surrounding neighborhood
over time.19 As the Florida Supreme Court long ago determined in Hartnett
v. Austin, the first priority in evaluating rezonings is whether it maintains
the “uniformity” of the zoning scheme and its “well-defined classes of
uses.”20 Indeed, under Florida law, it has even been held to be improper to
consider the particular use a property owner wants to make of his property:
A property owner is entitled to have his property properly
zoned based on proper zoning concepts without regard to
the one particular use which the owner might then intend to
make of the various uses permitted under a proper zoning
classification. A zoning authority’s insistence on
considering the owner’s specific use of a parcel of land
constitutes not zoning but direct governmental control of
the actual use of each parcel of land which is inconsistent
with constitutionally guaranteed private property rights.21
Deviating from the uniform system was considered to be arbitrary and
capricious and thus a basis to invalidate the rezoning decision.22
The downside of this rigid system is that it makes it difficult for a local
government to address a situation where a proposed zoning district would
permit some uses that are compatible with surrounding properties, but
would include other uses that may not be compatible. For example, a
modern warehouse and showroom development that is permitted in a light
industrial district and is not otherwise permitted in a commercial district
might be appropriately located next to a single-family neighborhood if
developed with noise attenuation and buffering, but other industrial uses
that are permitted within the same district might not be compatible with the

rezonings are quasi-judicial decisions. See infra Part IV.
19
See generally ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 44:3 (4th
ed. Apr. 2017 Update) (“Unnecessary and unchecked reliance on rezoning with conditions will
invariably exacerbate the problems of ad hocery and uncontrolled discretion that have long plagued the
zoning process. When utilized as a substitute for planning and a well drafted zoning code, the practice of
rezoning with conditions threatens to undercut even the modicum of the ‘rule of law’ that might be
embodied in a formally structured adjudicatory permit land use regulatory system.”).
20
See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
21
Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also
Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d 700, 702 (quoting Porpoise Point P’ship and holding that city’s
desire to retain property for promotion of affordable housing was an impermissible basis to reject
rezoning to commercial district of a property that was otherwise completely surrounded by properties
zoned and developed for commercial uses).
22
Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89 (“Such is certainly not consonant with our notion of government by
rule of law that affects alike all similarly conditioned.”).
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surrounding neighborhood.23 Conversely, imbalances can arise where “land
on the periphery of a highly restricted zone . . . feel[s] the impact of uses
maintained in an adjacent and less restricted zone . . . more heavily . . .
than . . . other land in the same district”; pressure then mounts to
“reclassif[y] land lying on the borderline of a district” because of the
“unequal hardship” on properties that are otherwise classified within the
same zoning district.24
One method local governments have unsuccessfully used to address
unique zoning considerations for a particular site is so-called “contract
zoning,” which is illegal. Contract zoning entails a municipality “enter[ing]
into a private contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning
ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed
or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner.”25
Most egregious is when a municipality has adopted a contract that commits
it in advance to rezone the property in a later proceeding, but the contract
was entered into without the strictures of either a zoning hearing or the
process attendant to amending an ordinance.26 Contract zoning is a violation
of the “long established principle that a municipality cannot contract away
the exercise of its police powers.”27

23
Cf. Kemp v. Miami-Dade Cty., Case No. 13-009GM, Recommended Order (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hr’gs Aug. 1, 2013), adopted in Final Order No. DEO-13-091 (Fla. Dept. of Econ. Opportunity Sept.
24, 2013). This case concerned a comprehensive plan amendment, not a rezoning, but because the issues
were resolved through the acceptance of a restrictive covenant addressing noise attenuation, buffering,
and other compatibility issues, it serves as a useful illustration of the complexities that can arise in landuse applications.
24
PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICA LAW OF ZONING § 9:20 (5th ed. 2014).
25
Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89.
26
Chung v. Sarasota Cty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1359–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“One of the reasons
contract zoning is generally rejected is because ‘[t]he legislative power to enact and amend zoning
regulations requires due process, notice, and hearings,’” whereas other legislative acts do not) (quoting
Terry Lewis et al., Spot Zoning, Contract Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL
& LAND USE LAW §§ 9-1, 9-13 (James J. Brown ed., 2d ed. 1994)).
27
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); see generally RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note
19, at § 44:10 (“Contract rezoning today is considered illegal largely on the ground that exercise of the
zoning power pursuant to a bilateral agreement between a developer and a municipality unlawfully
bargains away the municipality’s police power.”). Requiring the approval of neighbors or a
homeowner’s association before a zoning resolution can be adopted presents similar issues of whether
the police power has been unlawfully delegated. Pollard v. Palm Beach Cty., 560 So. 2d 1358, 1360
(Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[O]pinions of residents are not factual evidence and not a sound basis for denial
of a zoning change application.”); City of Apopka v. Orange Cty., 299 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA
1974) (“The objections of a large number of residents of the affected neighborhood are not a sound basis
for the denial of a permit.”); Town of Ponce Inlet v. Rancourt, 627 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
(“The agreement of neighbors should not be a sufficient or sound basis to allow a variance although it
could be a consideration in a close case. Neighbors and their attitudes change from time to time while
the variance does not.”); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2012-32 (2012) (“[A]n ordinance which delegates the
legislative power vested in the county commission to determine the public policy and regulate property
rights based on the written consent of all or a majority of the specified landowners and homeowners
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Another tailoring method is known as “conditional zoning,” which
refers to a “zoning amendment [i.e., a rezoning] which permits a use of
particular property in a zoning district subject to restrictions other than
those applicable to all land similarly classified.”28 Conditional zoning,
which has been permitted in other states,29 permits rezoning decisions to
better address situations in which “[u]navoidably, districts with unlike
restrictions abut one another.”30 Through conditional zoning, local
governments can address the resulting imbalance31 and can thus avoid a
continuing cycle of “hardship, petition, and relief.”32
One objection to conditional zoning is that it can become “illegal spot
zoning,” meaning a rezoning that creates a small island of property that
allows significantly more liberal uses than that of surrounding properties—
“solely for the benefit of a particular property owner.”33 The concern is that
conditional zoning creates “a clear incentive on the part of local officials to
substitute ‘zoning by negotiation’ for a well planned and standardized
zoning code.”34 But this concern is an overinflated outgrowth of courts’
preference for uniformity in a Euclidean system and may even be a case of

prior to accepting an application for rezoning might well be seen by a court as an invalid delegation of
the legislative power of the county.”). But see infra note 102.
28
Broward Cty. v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869, 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (quoting R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20 (2d ed. 1976)) (holding that County’s land-use approval was not
unlawful as conditional zoning, because the stipulated right-of-way exactions were no different than
would be required of similarly-zoned properties); M. Henning, Land Use—Goffinet v. Christian County:
New Flexibility In Illinois Zoning Law, 8 LOYOLA U.L.J. 642 (1977). This is distinct from a “conditional
use permit” or “special use permit,” in which particular uses are only permitted in certain zoning
districts upon a showing, at a public hearing, that applicable criteria are satisfied. See, e.g., Palm Beach
Polo, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 918 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (approving Planned Unit
Development, which is “a zoning device used to permit flexibility in design and use of property”
consisting of “an agreement between the land owner and the zoning authority, and the terms of
development are negotiated between the parties in accordance with the conditions set forth in the
governing ordinances”); Nostimo, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 594 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
(approving request for a “conditional use permit . . . to sell beer and wine for off premises
consumption”); Alachua Cty. v. Eagle’s Nest Farms, Inc., 473 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
(approving special use permit for a private airstrip).
29
Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia authorize some form of conditional rezoning without requiring creation of a new zoning
category. See RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:4.
30
SALKIN, supra note 24, at § 9:20.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see also RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:12 (“Generally, state courts uphold
conditional rezoning so long as the rezoning: (1) promotes the general welfare and not merely private
interests; (2) the rezoning does not otherwise constitute illegal spot zoning; (3) the conditions imposed
are reasonable and not otherwise illegal; and (4) there is no express agreement bargaining away a
municipality’s future use of the police power.”).
33
City Comm’n of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1240 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989).
34
RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:3; see also infra note 51.

02-KERBEL 5.9.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Restrictive Covenants

5/20/17 6:15 PM

271

courts improperly substituting their policy judgments as super-zoning
boards.35 Moving away from the suburban development model that
underlies the Euclidean system means recognizing that some locations that
may be appropriate for more intense or different uses than the surrounding
properties; but the existing zoning categories may not provide an
appropriate mix of uses; and rewriting the zoning code or creating new
categories may not be an appropriate or feasible solution. Conditional
zoning is actually more likely to ameliorate the “spot” effect, because it
would allow the appropriate introduction of different uses while also
limiting the potential incompatibility with the surrounding areas. Thus,
conditional rezoning would permit a more orderly change of neighborhood
character over time, rather than the abrupt change that can result after
piecemeal rezonings to new districts.36
In the 1956 decision of Hartnett v. Austin, the Florida Supreme Court
merged the objections to “contract zoning” with the objections to
“conditional zoning” and put a stop to using either vehicle to vary from the
“uniformity” requirement of Euclidean zoning. Hartnett concerned a
decision to rezone a property from a single-family residential district to a
commercial district, “subject to and dependent upon the full and complete
observance of the limitations, restrictions and other requirements” generally
described in the ordinance but to be effectuated through the subsequent
execution of a contract between the city and the property owner. The
rezoning ordinance prescribed that the contract would address the following
conditions:
(1) a ‘Bay Point type wall’ shall be placed around the
perimeter of the property not less than 40 feet inside the
property line abutting certain streets; (2) the 40-foot strip
shall at all times be kept and maintained in a condition
35
S. A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“The
Courts are not empowered to act as super zoning boards substituting their judgment for that of the
legislative and administrative bodies exercising legitimate objectives.”).
36
See, e.g., Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 553 So. 2d at 1233 (“Running through all of these cases
is the court’s determination that it is entirely arbitrary and not at all ‘fairly debatable’ on grounds that
make sense for the governing authority to allow for an entire transformation of the character of an area
through extensive rezoning of all nearby properties—and then to deny the subject property owner equal
treatment, although similarly situated. It is thought to be confiscatory of a person’s property in such
cases to prevent a property owner from utilizing his property in a certain way, when virtually all of his
adjoining neighbors are not subject to such a restriction. Often, as previously noted, the courts refer to
such arbitrary refusals to rezone as ‘reverse spot zoning’ because the refusal to rezone the subject
property creates, in effect, a veritable zoning island [as in Tollius], or a zoning peninsula [as in Manilow
and Olive], in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification. In these cases, the courts have
reasoned that a governing authority, although having large discretionary zoning power, may not, under
the guise of its police power, discriminate in such a blatant fashion against a property owner—as such
arbitrary governmental action violates the property owner’s constitutional right to make legitimate use
of his land.”).
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prescribed by the City Commission at the expense of the
property owner; (3) suitable contracts shall be entered into
between the city and the property owner covering the above
requirements and also providing for control of lights on the
premises in order to bring about ‘as little glare and
disturbance’ as possible to the people in the neighborhood
(this expense was to be borne by the property owner);
(4) the property owner should furnish and pay for adequate
police protection within the rezoned area; (5) to submit to
the City Commission for approval plans and specifications
of any proposed building; and (6) the property owner shall
not open access to certain abutting streets.37
Notably, these types of conditions frequently accompany approvals of sitespecific zoning approvals such as variances and exceptions.38
The Florida Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the rezoning, because
of the conditions and the need for a subsequent agreement to address the
impacts of the proposed commercial use on surrounding residential
properties. The Court held, “In exercising its zoning powers the
municipality must deal with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel of
property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter into private
contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and
zoning would collapse.”39 The Court further described the purported evils of
moving away from uniformity: “The zoning classifications of each parcel
would then be bottomed on individual agreements and private arrangements
that would totally destroy uniformity. Both the benefits of and reasons for a
well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme would be eliminated.”40 The
Hartnett court was particularly concerned about the need for significant
terms to be worked out in a separate instrument, and that the rezoning
ordinance was not complete on its face.41 But, beyond concern about the
method by which the city had conditioned the rezoning, the Hartnett court
appears to have been principally concerned with Euclidean zoning
principles of uniformity over flexibility.
The Florida Supreme Court’s reticence about conditional rezoning and
its emphasis on the “uniformity” of a zoning code were also rooted in older

37

Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1956).
See infra Part IV.
39
Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 88 (“The provisions of a municipal ordinance which conditions its effectiveness upon
the necessity for the subsequent execution of a contract with private parties such as was done in the case
at bar cannot be held to provide the degree of clarity and certainty that is required of municipal
legislation.”).
38
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notions that neighbors had vested rights in the zoning of other properties.42
Hence, the Hartnett court expressed concern that “[t]he residential owner
would never know when he was protected against commercial
encroachment” and that “[t]he commercial establishments . . . would never
know when they had protection against . . . smoke and noise producing
industries.”43 But the Florida Supreme Court later receded from the
suggestion that one can be vested to a zoning scheme.44 The court
specifically receded from Hartnett on this point, holding that “a rule of
estoppel cannot be read into such decisions as that of Hartnett v. Austin . . .
that a neighboring owner had a ‘right to a continuation of’ existing zoning
conditions sufficient to allow contest of an amendment by such party.”45
Nevertheless, the emphasis on preserving the Euclidean system remained,
primarily reflected in courts’ decisions invalidating zoning decisions by
classifying them as “spot zoning” or “reverse spot zoning.” 46
Despite the legal preference for uniformity in a zoning code, the need
to address the unique features or surrounding context of a particular parcel
or group of parcels has not gone away, in this or any other jurisdiction. But,
following Hartnett, the approval of a general zoning classification should
be complete on its face, and rezonings should not have unique conditions.47

42

Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89.
Id.
44
Oka v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 1962) (finding “no authority . . . that vested rights can
accrue to neighboring owners, or that ordinances altering zoning restrictions are to be tested by any
standard other than that applicable to zoning classification generally”) (footnotes omitted).
45
Id.; see also New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 95 F. 3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Because there is no general constitutional right to be free from all changes in land-use laws, . . .
[plaintiff] must do more than rely on the original zoning to establish an equitable estoppel.”).
46
See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
(prohibiting downzoning of “three blocks” to lower density residential category where “the surrounding
property was ‘a vast sea of [higher density districts] and other types of zoning’”); City Comm’n of City
of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (requiring
rezoning of residential parcel to commercial zone because surrounding properties had been granted
similar rezoning over time); Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA
1985); Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (rejecting, as “arbitrary
and unreasonable and . . . confiscatory,” continued zoning of property under residential category––even
though area north of subject property retained residential category––because of commercial zoning and
commercial development on remainder of surrounding properties).
47
Of course, rezonings may in fact have been approved with unique conditions; but if such
actions were not reversed on appeal, then they would remain valid today despite Hartnett and its
progeny. Any challenges to the legality of a unique condition on rezoning would be subject to the
jurisdictional limits on untimely appeals. Peltz v. Dist. Ct. of App., 3d Dist., 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla.
1992) (“The untimely filing of a notice of appeal precludes the appellate court from exercising
jurisdiction.”); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Peart, 843 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). The failure to
timely seek review of a zoning action would bar further challenges to that action. See State ex rel.
Sarasota Cty. v. Boyer, 360 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. 1978) (“As a general rule . . . matters determined in an
order which has become final without appeal are not later subject to appellate review simply because a
later order affected those matters or applied them to other interlocutory matters under
43
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Therefore, the only way to make certain that representations made in
support of a rezoning are enforceable is through the use of one of the oldest
forms of land-use control—a declaration of restrictive covenants.48 This
mechanism allows a zoning applicant to impose voluntary restrictions on
his or her own property through a covenant, which the zoning board can
consider in approving the rezoning and can subsequently enforce.
In Walberg v. Metro. Dade County, 296 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA
1974), the Third District distinguished Hartnett and accepted that voluntary
restrictions announced in a rezoning hearing—albeit not proffered as a
recordable covenant—are proper zoning considerations. Walberg concerned
a County-initiated “downzoning,” to rezone a property from a multi-family
zoning district to one of lower population density. At the hearing, the
property owner made representations to the zoning board regarding its
planned development of the property, to encourage denial of the rezoning.
The board rejected the rezoning, and two neighbors appealed. In holding
that the property owner’s representations were a valid zoning consideration
and did not constitute illegal contract zoning, the court distinguished
Hartnett: “it does not appear from this record that a private contract was
made by the County with a property owner for a change or perpetuation of
zoning.”49 Instead, “the most that can be said . . . is that the Commissioners
may have been influenced by representations made by South Cutler [the
developer who benefited from a denial of the proposed downzoning].”
From this, the Court held, “[a] rule which would forbid owners from
announcing concessions to the public interest in any proceeding before a
zoning authority would not be in the best interest of the public,” and the

consideration. . . .”); Atl. Shores Resort, LLC v. 507 S. St. Corp., 937 So. 2d 1239, 1243–44 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2006) (holding that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of issues before architectural review
commission); Paresky, 893 So. 2d at 665–66 (holding that collateral estoppel applies to zoning
proceedings); Miller v. Booth, 702 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (affirming County’s decision to
deny zoning application under “administrative res judicata” based on failure to show “substantial change
in circumstances”). Similarly, an original action to challenge a zoning decision would be subject to the
“catch-all” statute of limitations for challenges to local government ordinances or resolutions, which is 4
years from the date of adoption. See Milan Inv. Group, Inc. v. City of Miami, 50 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2011); Paresky v. Miami-Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 893 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA
2005).
48
See Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“The code
creates various zoning categories, including the BU–1A, Limited Business District, section 33–246
Dade County Code, which is the basic set of regulations applicable to the subject property. If
unrestricted, this category would permit a gas station on the subject property. Additionally, however, are
the sections providing for further restrictions as to specific properties. Thus section 33–33 of the code
provides that applications ‘may be granted subject to all reasonable restrictions and conditions deemed
necessary.’ This power to subject property to further restriction is emphasized in section 33–315 of the
code where the board of county commissioners is authorized to ‘take final action upon any and all
matters and requests contained in the application. . . .”).
49
Walberg, 296 So. 2d at 511.
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record did not show “that the Commission failed to consider the public’s
interest or acted upon the basis of a private contract.”50
At base, the key difference between contract zoning, conditional
zoning, and voluntary zoning covenants involves the method by which the
conditions are made binding. In pure contract zoning, bilateral promises are
made: both the local government and the applicant are bound to perform
specific actions. In conditional rezoning, the property is rezoned with
conditions not applicable to all properties in the same zoning district, which
would be inconsistent with Hartnett’s uniformity requirement (even if, in
the modern era, unique conditions may better address the blighting
influences that Euclid assumed imposing strict zoning districts would
correct). By contrast, with voluntary zoning covenants, the proffering party
binds itself to its own promises, but the local government is not required to
accept the offer; and the property is ultimately rezoned (or not, as in
Walberg) based on the uniform zoning scheme, while the zoning covenant
provides an additional layer of regulation that the local government can
enforce. But covenants come with their own unique legal requirements that
can dramatically affect the zoning process later.
II. FORMALITIES APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE COVENANTS
Restrictive covenants have been used since before the advent of zoning
laws.51 A private property owner who seeks to develop and subdivide his or
her property imposes restrictions for the benefit of all purchasers, and those
restrictions bind and run with each separate parcel of the subdivided land.52

50

Id.
See, e.g., Osius v. Barton, 147 So. 862, 867–68 (Fla. 1933) (“The natural desire of
householders to secure desirable home surroundings because of the growth of cities and the more
crowded conditions of modern life, has led to a demand for land limited to development purposes. This
natural desire has been so exploited by realtors and land companies, that restricted residential property is
now becoming the rule rather than the exception in our cities. The legal machinery to achieve this end
has been found in the main not in the ancient rules of easements or covenants, but in the activities of
courts of equity in preventing fraud and unfair dealing by those who take land with notice of a restriction
upon its use, so that in equity and good conscience they should not be permitted to act in violation of the
terms of such restrictions.”); Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 495–96 (1908); see generally RATHKOPF
ET AL., supra note 19, at § 1:1 (“As was the case with nuisance doctrine, the American approach to
restrictive covenants emerged from English common law. . . . American courts were less hostile—
perhaps boosted by a robust land records system and prescriptions as to the form such covenants could
take. Courts have either abolished or considerably liberalized some of the technical early common law
requirements for covenants to run with the land and to be enforceable by and against later owners.”).
52
Stephl v. Moore, 114 So. 455, 455 (Fla. 1927) (“Covenants restraining the free use of real
property, although not favored in law, will be enforced by the courts when the restriction applies to the
location of buildings to be erected on the land, and such restrictions are carried in all deeds with a view
to preserve the symmetry, beauty, and general good of all interested in the scheme of development. The
benefit of the restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser, irrespective of the time of purchase.”);
51
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For example, a restrictive covenant may prohibit commercial enterprises
within a residential development,53 it may require that residential buildings
be set back a particular distance from the street,54 or it may prohibit fences
on waterfront lots.55 The restriction can be contained in the deed of
conveyance for the property,56 or it can be contained in a separate
instrument, such as a plat57 or a declaration of restrictions.58 But the
instrument will be considered a “covenant running with the land,” and not
merely a covenant personal to an individual owner, if, among other terms,
“performance of the covenant . . . touch[es] and involve[s] the land or some
right or easement annexed and appurtenant thereto, and tends necessarily to
enhance the value of the property or renders it more convenient and
beneficial to the owner.”59
In general, restrictive covenants fall into three classes.60 The first class
are “those which are entered into with the design to carry out a general
scheme for the improvement or development of real property,” in which
“the covenant is enforceable by any grantee as against any other, upon the
theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, which binds
each and gives to each the appropriate remedy.”61 The second class are
“those cases in which the grantor exacts the covenant from his grantee . . .
for the benefit and protection of contiguous or neighboring lands which the
former retains,” but in which the grantees “cannot enforce the covenant as
against each other” and only “the grantor and his assigns of the property
RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 1:1 (“Generally, reciprocal covenants on residential use imposed
for the benefit of all the land of a common grantor and evidencing a general scheme or plan for
development and use are enforceable by any later landowner or representative owners’ association for
whose benefit they were imposed, despite technical common law rules involving ‘privity of estate’ or
that covenants ‘touch and concern’ the land.”).
53
See, e.g., Osius, 147 So. at 863–64.
54
Stephl, 114 So. 455.
55
Rea v. Brandt, 467 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
56
Osius, 147 So. at 863–64.
57
Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
58
See, e.g., Fiore v. Hilliker, 993 So. 2d 1050, 1051–52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“The restrictions
did not appear on the face of the deed, but were referred to in the deed as ‘Schedule B’ and were
recorded in the Lee County public records.”); AC Assocs. v. First Nat. Bank of Florida, 453 So. 2d 1121,
1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (parking agreement reciprocally affecting two adjacent parcels of real
property and recorded in public records).
59
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheffield Steel Products, Inc., 105 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958);
see also Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344, 1347 (Fla. 1980) (“A developer, in carrying out a
uniform plan of development for a residential subdivision, may arrange for the provision of services to
the subdivision or for the maintenance of facilities devoted to common use, and may bind the purchasers
of homes there to pay for them. In this case, all of the elements of an affirmative covenant running with
the land have been established.”).
60
Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 495–96 (1908); see generally 51 A.L.R. 3d 556 (1973)
(recognizing Korn as “the leading case on the subject in this country”).
61
Korn, 192 N.Y. at 495–96.
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benefited may enforce it against either or all of the grantees.”62 The third
class are “mutual covenants between owners of adjoining lands, in which
the restrictions placed upon each produce a corresponding benefit to the
other, and . . . either party or his assigns may invoke equitable aid to
restrain a violation of the covenant.”63
The elements to establish a covenant running with the land are:
(1) “constructive notice, and intent, expressed in the declaration, that the
covenant run”; (2) “privity, of contract and estate, between the covenanting
parties, and succession to the interest of the covenantee by the party seeking
to enforce”; (3) “a uniform plan of development, with benefit to correspond
to burden, in that all of the lots in the subdivision were to be charged and
benefitted,” or, if not uniform or reciprocal, “an agreement creating a
negative easement or equitable servitude . . . which was contractual in
nature”; and (4) that “the covenant enhanced the value or enjoyment of the
property, so it touches and concerns the land.”64
A private restrictive covenant operates like a contract,65 except that the
parties seeking to enforce its terms do not necessarily have to be in direct
privity with one another. When property is subdivided and sold with
“restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or
improvement,” any grantee can enforce the restrictions against any other.66
This authority rests on “the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and
consideration” or, alternatively, on “the ground that mutual negative
equitable easements are created.”67 Notably, “this doctrine is not dependent
62

Id.
Id.
64
Bessemer, 381 So. 2d at 1348 n.3 (Fla. 1980) (citing Frumkes v. Boyer, 101 So. 2d 387 (Fla.
1958); Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1956); Volunteer Security Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla.
1947); Osius, 147 So. 862; Burdine v. Sewell, 109 So. 648 (Fla. 1926); Armstrong v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 95 So. 506, 510 (Fla. 1922) (Whitfield, J., dissenting); Fiore, 993 So. 2d at 1052–53 (“[I]t is not
necessary that a restrictive covenant be reciprocal when the division of property was not made pursuant
to a general scheme or plan. Rather, the restrictive covenant in this case was an agreement creating a
negative easement or equitable servitude.”); Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966);
Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheffield Steel Prods.,
Inc., 105 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); RALPH E. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
24.04, at 579–80 (1977).
65
See Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla. 1969) (“An easement
of way is essentially an inherently legal interest in land, as distinguished from a restriction resulting
from a restrictive covenant, which is but a creature of equity arising out of contract.”); Wahrendorff, 93
So. 2d at 722 (en banc) (“[R]estrictive covenants [on a plat] . . . will be recognized and enforced when
established by contract between the parties involved. . . . [U]pon a severance of title by the grant of one
or more lots according to the plat and by reference thereto, the restriction then springs into existence and
becomes binding as between the subdivider and his purchasers and as between the purchasers inter
sese.”); Fiore, 993 So. 2d 1053 (“[T]he restrictive covenant in this case was an agreement creating a
negative easement or equitable servitude . . . which was contractual in nature.”).
66
Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
67
Id.
63
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on whether the covenant is to be construed as running with the land.”68
Furthermore, for private covenants, “it is not necessary that a
restrictive covenant be reciprocal when the division of property was not
made pursuant to a general scheme or plan,” as the restrictive covenant
could instead be “an agreement creating a negative easement or equitable
servitude . . . which was contractual in nature.”69 Under Florida law,
“covenants restraining the free use of realty are not favored.”70 Florida
courts will nonetheless enforce private covenants “to provide the fullest
liberty of contract and the widest latitude possible in disposition of one’s
property,” unless the covenants are “contrary to public policy” or
“contravene any statutory or constitutional provisions,” and provided that
“the intention is clear and the restraint is within reasonable bounds.” 71
Private restrictive covenants are generally enforced by the private
parties with rights in the covenant. Indeed, private restrictions can restrict
the use or development of property even if the use or development would
otherwise be permitted under applicable zoning regulations.72 Restrictive
covenants may be enforced in suits of equity by a party for whose benefit
the restriction was established,73 provided that the “subsequent grantee who

68
Id.; see also Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1982)
(“[A] remote grantee may enforce restrictive covenants against another remote grantee when a common
grantor intended to create a uniform building plan or scheme of restrictions.”); Silver Blue Lake
Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1971) (“Whether a
restrictive agreement is technically one ‘running with the land’ is material in equity only on the question
of notice, since if it runs with the land it is binding regardless of notice and, if not, the owner is bound
only if he takes the land with notice.”).
69
Fiore, 993 So. 2d 1052–53.
70
Hagan, 186 So. 2d at 308–09.
71
Id.; see also Fiore, 993 So. 2d at 1052–53 (holding that building restriction prohibiting
structures over certain height near river enforceable even though property owner seeking enforcement
did not have a reciprocal restriction, because building restriction was a “negative easement” imposed as
a restrictive covenant as a condition of the sale of property); Robins v. Walter, 670 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla.
1st DCA 1995) (holding that bed and breakfast inn in residential development violated deed restriction
prohibiting ongoing business or commercial use of property and holding, “while we are aware that
restrictive covenants should be narrowly construed, they should never be construed in a manner that
would defeat the plain and obvious purpose and intent of the restriction.”).
72
Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1957) (“As to the effect of the rezoning in
cases such as this [to cancel contractual restrictive covenants], we are of the view that such action by an
official body is admissible in evidence but it is not conclusive.”); Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway
Auth., 182 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (“It is well settled that the zoning or rezoning of real
property cannot in any way abolish, abrogate or enlarge lawful contractual covenants and restrictions
pertaining thereto.”); Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (“The zoning regulations
of Dade County, Florida, did not abrogate the restrictions nor impair the lawful contract rights created
thereby.”).
73
Osius v. Barton, 147 So. 862, 865 (Fla. 1933) (“The rule is well established that where a
covenant in a deed provides against certain uses of the property conveyed which may be noxious or
offensive to the neighborhood, inhabitants, those suffering from a breach of such covenant, though not
parties to the deed, may be afforded relief in equity upon a showing that the covenant was for their
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seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant created by a common grantor against
another subsequent grantee of a separate parcel of realty . . . show[s] that
the covenant was intended to apply to both parcels.”74 Thus, one resident of
a subdivision subject to a restrictive covenant requiring a particular setback
could obtain an injunction to prohibit a second resident from allowing the
second resident’s home to encroach into the setback on the second
resident’s property.75
In general, “interpretation of a contract or a covenant is a matter of
law” that is governed by “the intentions of the parties,” the “best evidence”
of which is the “plain language of the contract” or “covenant.”76
Amendments to a private covenant are subject to a similar analysis, in that
courts will look first to the express terms of the covenant as to how it may
be amended.77 Where there is a uniform plan of development, the
enforceability of amendments is governed not only by the terms of the
declaration but also by a test of “reasonableness,”78 to ensure that “the
reserved power be exercised in a reasonable manner so as not to destroy the
general plan.”79 But private covenants generally require that amendments or
benefit as owners of neighboring properties.”).
74
Rea v. Brandt, 467 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
75
Stephl, 114 So. 455, 455 (Fla. 1927); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA
1958) (“It was the view of the chancellor that the covenants were for the benefit of all the grantees and
they could enforce them.”). But see Finchum v. Vogel, 194 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (“The
possibility of reverter on a condition subsequent is a personal right reserved to the grantor which may be
enforced only by the grantor, its successors or assigns. It therefore necessarily follows that these socalled ‘restrictions’ may not be construed as covenants for the benefit of all grantees from the common
grantor, and no grantee has any rights against any other grantee by way of enforcement which they
would have in the absence of a reservation of a general power to modify and in the absence of a
provision for reverter having the effect of a condition subsequent.”) (internal citations omitted).
76
Royal Oak Landing Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Pelletier, 620 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA
1993).
77
See, e.g., Holiday Pines Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Wetherington, 596 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1992) (looking to terms “within the contemplation of the grantor and the grantee” and “to the
documents themselves” for authority to amend covenant); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta
Ass’n, 316 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (affirming modification of restrictions to prohibit use of
land for any use other than single-family dwelling, where modification was approved in accordance with
modification clause of restriction providing that “restrictions, conditions, covenants and reservations
may be modified, amended or entirely rescinded by and with the consent of the grantors, their heirs,
assigns or representatives and a majority of the owners of lots in said subdivision”); Gercas v. Davis,
188 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (“No release of the restrictions was obtained from the subdivider,
or any of the residential lot owners in the subdivision. It would seem that under these circumstances a
release or a modification of the restriction by the owners of the lots so restricted, so as to permit the sale
of alcoholic beverages, would be a nullity.”).
78
Wetherington, 596 So. 2d at 87.
79
Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1982) (recognizing that
“[t]here may be times . . . when the grantor reserves too much power or other factors support a finding
that a common building plan was not intended.”); Luani Plaza, Inc. v. Burton, 149 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla.
3d DCA 2014) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . comprises a reasonable exercise of the amending power of
the Declaration. . . . It is true that a prohibition on ‘residential use’ is not among the 146 prohibited uses
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releases be approved by all of the original parties, or their successors,
unless the covenant specifies a different modification process.80
Because getting all of the property owners to agree to modify a private
covenant may be impossible, either because the other owners will not agree

of the project in the Declaration. However, a cursory perusal of these prohibitions, especially when
considered within the context of the entire document, leaves little doubt the scrivener had but one thing
in mind—commercial use—at the time of drafting.”), reh’g denied (2014), review denied, 168 So. 3d
223 (Fla. 2015).
80
Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (restriction against church use would
be enforced despite acquiescence of owner-subdivider to use, because “such acquiescence could not and
would not bind or waive the rights of the other parties to the agreement creating the restrictive
covenants”); see also In re Heatherwood Holdings, LLC, 746 F. 3d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[B]ecause HGC did not represent every Heatherwood homeowner at the time the Agreement between
HGC and FCB was entered, the implied restrictive covenant could not have been destroyed by the
Agreement.”); Wood v. Dozier, 464 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 1985) (“Where a purchaser of land intends
to use it for a purpose not allowed by a restrictive covenant, he should seek to have the deed restriction
removed before purchasing the property.”); Luani Plaza, Inc. v. Burton, 149 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2014) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment to the Declaration prohibiting residential use of the units . . . was
properly adopted by the unit owners. Article X, Section 3 of the Declaration provides that it ‘may be
amended at any time and from time to time upon execution and recordation of an instrument executed
by the Owners holding not less than four-fifths of the voting interests.’”), reh’g denied (2014), review
denied, 168 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 2015); Essenson v. Polo Club Assocs., 688 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997) (“[S]ince the agreement was not mutually modified, since any changes in conditions were as a
result of the actions of Polo Club and since the covenant continues to provide benefits, the court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of Polo Club and should have entered one in favor of Huntley
Lane Associates.”); Dolphins Plus, Inc. v. Hobdy, 650 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“The fact
that the heirs of the developers subsequently gave Dolphins Plus a lease for this purpose does not alter
this result because, as a matter of law, the lease alone was not sufficient to release or terminate the plat
restriction.”); AC Assocs. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984);
Endruschat v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (developer “cannot release
any restrictions after the property encompassed by any such restrictions has been sold by him”); Balzer
v. Indian Lake Maint., Inc., 346 So. 2d 146, 147–48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (affirming covenant that would
“be automatically renewed for each ten year period [after January 1, 1966], unless owners of at least
two-thirds of the lots in the subdivision known as Indian Lake Estates shall, at least six months prior to
any such renewal date, agree in writing to a change in or an abrogation of any of the above covenants,
and record such writing so amending the aforesaid covenants.”); Field Properties, Inc. v. Fritz, 315 So.
2d 101, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (that subgrantee obtained control of grantor corporation and attempted
to release deed restrictions was ineffective where deed did not reserve in grantor right to release
restriction); Johnson v. Three Bays Properties No. 2, Inc., 159 So. 2d 924, 925–26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
(“Appellants did not question appellee’s right to amend the declaration of protective covenants, without
the consent of the appellants. . . . ‘Words and phrases used in contracts should be given the ordinary and
commonly understood and accepted meaning.’ The word modify is commonly understood to mean
alteration or change. Thus alteration or change is not restrictive, it may be characterized, in a
quantitative sense, as either an increase or decrease.”); Harwick v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So.
2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (“[T]he agreement of 1944 was unenforceable and void because of the
failure of all the property owners in the subdivision to execute it. . . . Therefore, same did not operate to
relax the restrictive single family residence restrictions within the subdivision which are still enforceable
by the appellant.”) (citing Tolar, 96 So. 2d at 554); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1958) (citing Tolar and holding that “covenants were for the benefit of all the grantees and they
could enforce them”); McCown v. Gottlieb, 465 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Ala. 1985) (agreement between
grantors and one lot owner which purported to release the covenant prohibiting subdivision was
ineffective and void).
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or because they are so numerous that their signatures cannot feasibly be
gathered,81 the law recognizes other alternatives for these instruments. First,
private covenants are governed by the “rule against unreasonable restraints
on the use of property,” which “concerns restraints of such duration that
they prevent the free alienation of property.”82 Private restrictions are thus
subject to “the test of reasonableness,” and “[t]he validity or invalidity of a
restraint depends upon its long-term effect on the improvement and
marketability of the property.”83 And because the law generally discourages
restraints on the free use of real property, “substantial ambiguity or doubt
must be resolved against the person claiming the right to enforce the
covenant.”84
Equity also permits courts to consider changes in circumstance and to
determine that it would be unfair to enforce a private covenant. A court of
equity may “cancel a restrictive covenant in a deed as a cloud on title”
where it finds that: restrictions “have come to an end because of
circumstances that have arisen which would show that the purpose for
which the restrictions were imposed have come to an end”; and “the use of
the tract of land for whose benefit the restrictions were established has so
utterly changed that no party . . . could be heard to enforce it in equity, or
would suffer any damage by the violation of such restrictions.”85 Thus, a
court of equity could refuse to enforce private restrictions “where the
equitable enforcement of building restrictions would be oppressive and
unreasonable because of an entire change in the circumstances and in the
neighborhood of the property, and the character of the improvements and
the purposes to which they are applied.”86

81
See, e.g., Wood, 464 So. 2d at 1170; Luani Plaza, 149 So. 3d at 715; Essenson, 688 So. 2d at
984; Dolphins Plus, 650 So. 2d at 214; AC Assocs., 453 So. 2d at 1130; Endruschat, 377 So. 2d at 741;
Field Properties, 315 So. 2d at 103; Three Bays Properties No. 2, 159 So. 2d at 925–26; Harwick, 142
So. 2d at 129; Batman, 101 So. 2d at 590; Tolar, 96 So. 2d at 556; McCown, 465 So. 2d at 1123; In re
Heatherwood Holdings, 746 F. 3d at 1218.
82
Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. 1980).
83
Id.; see also Seagate Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
(“Our courts have traditionally undertaken to determine the validity of restraints by measuring them in
terms of their duration, type of alienation precluded, or the size of the class precluded from taking.”).
84
Washingtonian Apartment Hotel Co. v. Schneider, 75 So. 2d 907, 909 (Fla. 1954) (reversing
injunction to enforce restriction that was ambiguous); Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901, 904 (Fla. 1925).
85
Osius, 147 So. at 865.
86
Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp. v. Bishop, 163 So. 214, 216 (Fla. 1935). In Edgewater Beach
Hotel Corp., the Florida Supreme Court reversed an injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant to
prohibit the construction of a hotel on Ocean Drive in Miami Beach. The court noted that “the
restrictions were written at a time when the city of Miami Beach was a small village of between 500 and
1,000 people” but that the population was then “something like 20,000 people.” Moreover, when Ocean
Drive was widened, little attention was paid to the deed restrictions, and buildings were erected
indiscriminately. Additionally, “[t]hose lots, which were evidently designed to accommodate the most
modest sort of a dwelling to cost around $1,500, are now of such value that to erect such a dwelling on
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Cancellation of a private covenant is nevertheless an extraordinary
remedy. The test to determine whether a private restriction remains
enforceable is
whether or not the original purpose and intention of the
parties to such covenant can be reasonably carried out, in
the light of alleged material changes which are claimed to
have effectually frustrated their object without fault or
neglect on the part of the one who seeks to be relieved of
their observance;
this test is rooted in “the principle of contract law known as discharge of
contractual obligation by frustration of contractual object.”87 Moreover,
judicial modification or cancellation of privately negotiated property
restrictions is generally disfavored, because “[s]ubstantial uncertainty for
property owners as to rights and obligations would . . . result . . . if courts,
at the instance of a suing property owner and over the objection of adjacent
property owners, could modify or cancel a . . . property restriction.”88
Once imposed, private covenants can be difficult to dislodge without
expending significant resources to either obtain the approval of all affected

them would be to indulge in utter foolishness.” Because “[t]he conditions have entirely changed since
the plat was made and the lots sold by the developers of the subdivision,” the complainant’s remedy
would not be to enforce the restriction but would at most be in an action at law to recover damages for
the alleged breach of the covenant. Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp., 163 So. at 216. But see Allen v.
Avondale Co., 185 So. 137, 138 (Fla. 1938) (“The changes shown to have taken place would ordinarily
be sufficient to grant relief from enforcing the covenants but it is shown that all these changes took place
before Appellant purchased his lot; he was therefore on notice of them and all but one were in another
subdivision.”); Wood v. Dozier, 464 So. 2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 1985) (affirming continued vitality of
Avondale holding “that where the owner of property who seeks relief from the enforcement of restrictive
covenants shall be denied the relief sought when he is on notice that all material changes in the
neighborhood occurred prior to his purchase of the property”).
87
Osius, 147 So. at 862; Acopian v. Haley, 387 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (citing
Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 164 So. 551 (Fla. 1935)). Restrictive covenants that do not appear on
the face of a deed, or in a plat referenced in a deed, may also be subject to extinguishment after 30 years
under Florida’s Marketable Record Titles to Real Property Act (MRTA), Ch. 712, Fla. Stat. (2017).
Martin v. Town of Palm Beach, 643 So. 2d 112, 114–15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“[T]he 1957 deed is the
root of title, as well as the only muniment of title. . . . [T]he 1957 deed does not contain the use
restriction set forth in the 1948 deed, but instead only generally states that the conveyance is subject to
easements, covenants, limitations, reservations, and restrictions of record. Because this language fails to
comport with the requirements of section 712.03(1), the use restriction contained in the 1948 deed has
not been preserved.”).
88
AC Assocs., 453 So. 2d at 1130 (“Substantial uncertainty for property owners as to rights and
obligations would, we believe, result under circumstances like this if courts, at the instance of a suing
property owner and over the objection of adjacent property owners, could modify or cancel a
commercial (or residential) property restriction on the basis that it is unreasonable by reason of a
different type of commercial (or residential) use planned by the suing property owner. This would
especially appear to be the case when, as here, the commercial uses of the adjacent property, which is
the only other property covered by the restriction, have remained the same. As a general rule, property
owners accommodate to property restrictions, not vice versa.”).
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property owners or to seek judicial modification or cancellation. For private
covenants, this may well be a feature, not a bug. But, for covenants
involving the public zoning process, it poses significant challenges.
III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR ZONING COVENANTS
Restrictive covenants accepted through the zoning process present
unique considerations.89 First, as the First District determined, covenants
involving government are not mere legal instruments, but are, rather,
solemn promises to its citizenry:
In dealing with its citizenry, the Government is required to
adhere to the same strict rule of rectitude of conduct and
the turning of the same square corner as the Government
requires of its citizens. . . . Just as one by deep deliberation
may not add “one cubit unto his stature,” even so, the
Government through the convenient process of legislative
enactment may not render ineffective by “one jot or one
tittle,” its solemn covenant with its citizenry.90
Second, and more significantly, restrictive covenants accepted by a
zoning authority become something more than solemn promises: they
become law.91 Thus, zoning covenants not only observe the formalities of

89
This article focuses on restrictive covenants related to rezonings, but governments accept
restrictive covenants with other zoning actions such as unusual uses, special exceptions, and variances,
and in other regulatory contexts as well. For example, Miami-Dade County environmental regulations
permit development of properties containing ecologically sensitive wetlands, subject to restrictions to
mitigate the environmental impacts of the development. See Ch. 24, Art. IV, Div. 1, Code of MiamiDade County, Fla. One of the mitigation mechanisms the County may employ is to require the owner to
execute a mitigation covenant over a portion of the property to be developed. Such covenants “restrict
development or alteration of the property to a designated portion of the property and may include
conditions for the environmental protection and environmental management of designated portions of
the property,” and may only be released or modified with the approval of the County. §§ 2448.2(I)(B)(2)(b), 24-48.2(II)(B)(10)(c), Code of Miami-Dade County, Fla. Such mitigation is proffered
pursuant to Florida law when an application for development does not otherwise meet the State’s
criteria. See, e.g., § 373.414(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“If the applicant is unable to otherwise meet the
criteria set forth in this subsection, the governing board or the department, in deciding to grant or deny a
permit, shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate adverse effects
that may be caused by the regulated activity. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, onsite
mitigation, offsite mitigation, offsite regional mitigation, and the purchase of mitigation credits from
mitigation banks permitted under s. 373.4136. It shall be the responsibility of the applicant to choose the
form of mitigation. The mitigation must offset the adverse effects caused by the regulated activity.”);
§ 373.414(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017); Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-345.100–62-345.600.
90
Okaloosa Island Leaseholder’s Ass’n v. Hayes, 362 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
(quoting Matt. 5:19, 6:27 (King James) and citing Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1950)).
91
Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
(“The restrictive zoning covenant sealed the intent and objectives of the County’s regulation of the golf
course property. This Court has determined that a ZAB resolution, containing a restrictive covenant,
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private covenants, but also the law accords them a special status befitting of
their creation and acceptance as local laws. Courts should thus give the
same level of deference to zoning covenants as they give to other
regulations.92
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570
So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), the Third District explained the legal
status of covenants accepted in conjunction with zoning approvals. In that
case, the property owners had nearly completed constructing a gas station
when the County discovered that it had issued the permit in error: the
resolution rezoning the property to a commercial district had been approved
subject to acceptance of a covenant restricting the use of the property to a
bank or savings and loan.93 Indeed, the covenant had never been recorded,
but the rezoning resolution “clearly expressed that the county commission
granted rezoning only for a bank or savings and loan.”94 The Court held that
property owners have constructive notice of the generic zoning regulations
in the applicable zoning ordinances, the zoning resolutions adopted for the
specific property and, significantly, the terms of covenants accepted in
connection with zoning resolutions: “[T]he public is on notice that . . .
[zoning] resolutions which are passed subsequent to public hearing can
modify districts and restrict property use; and that the rights of property
owners can thus be limited.”95 The court further held that it was “illegal” to
violate the terms of the zoning covenant, thereby recognizing that zoning
resolutions and attendant conditions or covenants are, in effect, local laws.96
An earlier Third District decision explored the interplay between the
law governing restrictive covenants and the law of zoning. In NorwoodNorland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987), the court heard an appeal from a decision to rezone certain
property around Dolphin Stadium, and to release that property from a
previously-accepted zoning covenant. The covenant, accepted by the
County in 1977, restricted the property to lower density uses like a park or a
school, and contained the following modification clause:
This Agreement may be modified, amended, or released as
to any portion of the land described herein by a written
instrument executed by the then-owner of the fee-simple
constitutes a governmental regulation with the force of law.”); Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So.
2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“Such a restriction on the property’s use which was made in the
public interest became binding upon the property,” and violation of the covenant’s use restriction
“would be illegal.”).
92
See infra Part IV.
93
Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
94
Id. at 1007–08.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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title to the lands to be affected by such modification,
amendment or release, along with a majority of the
property owners within 350 ft. of the property for which
such modification is proposed, as well as along with a
majority of the property within 350 ft. of the property
shown in the Plan, and approved after public hearing by
Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners or
Zoning Appeals Board of Metropolitan Dade County,
Florida, whichever by law has jurisdiction over such
subject matter.97
The petitioners contended that the County had not followed the terms
of the covenant in approving the rezoning, because the County had allowed
the developers to reduce the rezoning area and thereby eliminate the need to
seek consent from property owners beyond that reduced radius.98 The
petitioners also contended that the County had violated the majority vote
requirement, because it allowed affected property owners to vote based on
the number of parcels they owned; they contended that it should have been
one vote per owner, not one vote per parcel.99
Notably, the court considered the covenant issue as part of the zoning
appeal, not in an original action seeking enforcement of the covenant. But,
while the issue arose in an appeal of the zoning resolution, the court
nevertheless looked principally to the express terms of the modification
clause in the covenant. The court held that “drawing the lines in by 351 feet
to obtain a majority vote [was] in full compliance with the restrictive
covenant,” as the modification clause allowed for the covenant to be
released as to only a portion of the subject property.100 As for the tabulation
of majority votes, the court looked to Florida law on private restrictive
covenants, which held that private covenants are to be “strictly construed in
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property” and that ambiguous terms
are to be “resolved against the party claiming the right to enforce the
restriction.”101 The court observed that “the provisions for release of the
restrictive covenant are susceptible to different interpretations” and that
there “was no evidence in the record as to the parties’ intentions in drafting
the covenant.”102 The court affirmed tabulation as one vote per parcel,
because, under those facts, that interpretation was “consistent with the

97
Norwood-Norland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987).
98
Id. at 1013.
99
Id.
100 Id. at 1014.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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pronounced policy against land restrictions.”103 But the latter was a curious
conclusion, because, had several owners of multiple parcels instead been
against the change, then, under the court’s interpretation, the result would
have been to defeat the change and to retain the land restrictions.
Norwood-Norland is significant because it showed the court
recognizing the hybrid nature of zoning covenants: the covenant’s specific
terms may be reviewed by analogy to the standards applicable to private
restrictive covenants, but that review takes place within the process for
review of zoning actions. This method of reviewing a regulatory zoning
covenant is consistent with the principles that regulatory covenants are a
form of local law104 and, as local laws, are entitled to the deference afforded
to local regulations under the police power.105
The Third District further examined the interplay between the law
governing private covenants and the law of zoning in its en banc opinion in
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Sunlink concerned a 1974 covenant recorded by AT&T to induce the
County to rezone its property from residential use to light industrial use.106
Because the subject property was surrounded by residential uses, the
covenant restricted the industrially-zoned properties so that the property
could only be conveyed to “entities owned, controlled by, or affiliated with
the Owner [AT&T].”107 The covenant further provided that the restrictions
would run for thirty years, with automatic ten-year extensions,
unless an instrument signed by a majority of the then
owner(s) of the real property and a majority of those within
500 feet of the boundary of the property has been recorded,
agreeing to change the covenants in whole or in part,
providing the covenants have first been released by the
Commission.108
In 1989, the nature of the telecommunications industry had changed so
significantly that Sunlink, which had received the property from the
divestiture of AT&T, no longer needed the property and sought to sell it—
but the zoning covenant impeded the sale.109 Rather than pursuing a zoning
application in compliance with the modification clause, as was done in
Norwood-Norland, Sunlink filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to

103
104
105
106

Norwood-Norland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009, 1014.
Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
See infra Part IV.
Metro. Dade Cty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d 551, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), on reh’g (Feb.

2, 1993).
107
108
109

Id. at 551–52.
Id.
Id. at 552.
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invalidate the covenant based on changed circumstances and unreasonable
restraint of alienation110––theories that can be used to extinguish private
restrictions.111 The trial court had granted judgment in favor of Sunlink, but
the Third District reversed.
The appellate court considered the factors for unreasonable restraint
claims––namely the duration of the restraint, the type of alienation
precluded, and the size of the precluded class.112 The court determined the
term to be reasonable, because it was subject to cancellation or modification
with the written consent of the neighbors. As to the type of alienation
precluded, the court––relying on Fontainebleau Gas & Wash––held that
“unmarketability” was not the proper consideration for a covenant “created
and recorded to preserve the nature of the neighborhood and to induce the
county to change the zoning classification.”113 The court further held that
the covenant “continues to preserve the character of the neighborhood and
is therefore ‘reasonable when judged in view of the justifiable expectations
of the parties.’”114 Finally, as to the size of the precluded class, the Court
held that it was not unlimited or absolute––and therefore not
unreasonable—because if AT&T or Sunlink “wish[ed] to remove or modify
the restrictive covenant, they can follow the steps outlined in the
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants.”115 The en banc panel thus directed
Sunlink “to seek release from the covenant by the mechanism prescribed in
the covenant itself,”116 namely the zoning process and the neighbors’
written consents.
Especially noteworthy about Sunlink is the Court’s reliance on the
zoning purpose of the covenant within the traditional framework for equity
review of private covenant modifications The covenant could be subject to
further attack, but that challenge would likely have to originate in an appeal
of a zoning decision implicating the terms of the covenant, as was done in
Norwood-Norland.
The interplay between private covenant law and zoning law is further
illustrated in the recent decision of Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews
Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), reh’g denied
(June 6, 2016), review denied, SC16-1189, 2016 WL 7474142 (Fla. Dec.

110

Id.
See supra Part II.
112
Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 551, 553–56 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting; adopted as the opinion
of the en banc court).
113
Id. at 553–56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (Jorgenson, J., dissenting; adopted as the opinion of the en
banc court).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 556.
111
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29, 2016). That case concerned, not a rezoning, but an “unusual use” zoning
approval for a golf course and country club use. Consistent with Hartnett,
that is the type of site-specific application that could be subject to sitespecific conditions (without a covenant) without constituting either contract
zoning or conditional zoning.117 A covenant would therefore not have been
necessary. But, in that context, covenants serve to further solemnize the
applicant’s representations to induce approval. They also serve as a form of
super-notice to anyone acquiring an interest in the property, because the
covenant is recorded in the public records and should be found in a search of
the property’s chain of title.118 The analysis in Save Calusa Trust is
nevertheless instructive, because the terms of the Calusa covenant are
similar to those of covenants that have accompanied rezonings.119
In Calusa, one of the conditions in the zoning resolution was “[t]hat
restrictive covenants running with the land in proper covenant form,
meeting with the approval of the Zoning Director, be recorded to ensure
that the golf course be perpetually maintained as such.”120 The covenant
that the developer recorded in 1968 provided:
The aforedescribed property may only be used for the
following purposes:
A golf course and for the operation of a country club which
may include a clubhouse, pro shop, locker rooms,
swimming pools, cabanas, liquor, beer and wine facilities,
dining room facilities, parking, tennis courts, putting
greens, golf driving ranges and all other uses incidental
thereto.

117
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1956) (“[T]he applicant [ ] was not appealing to a
Board of Adjustment for a variance on the basis of any hardship. . . . What we have here held might not
be applicable to a proper application for a variance by an owner based on hardship.”). Zoning covenants
are not just used with rezonings. They may be used with other types of applications, such as variances,
special exceptions, and unusual uses. Consistent with Hartnett, those types of zoning actions may be
subject to special conditions, so a covenant would not be necessary. But, in that context, covenants serve
to further solemnize the applicant’s representations to induce approval. They also serve as a form of
super-notice to anyone acquiring an interest in the property, because the covenant is recorded in the
public records and should be found in a search of the property’s chain of title. See First Am. Title Ins.
Co. of St. Lucie Cty., Inc. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“By statute, the clerk is
required to record, index, and maintain documents relating to real property in the public records.”);
§ 28.222, Fla. Stat. (2017).
118
See First Am. Title Ins. Co. of St. Lucie Cty., Inc. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1992) (“By statute, the clerk is required to record, index, and maintain documents relating to
real property in the public records.”); § 28.222, Fla. Stat. (2017).
119
See, for example Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 551 and Norwood-Norland Homeowners’
Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d at 1009.
120
Save Calusa Trust, 193 So. 3d at 912.
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These restrictions shall continue for a period of ninety-nine
years unless released or revised by the Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Dade, State of Florida, or
its successors with the consent of 75% of the members of
the corporation owning the aforedescribed property and
those owners within 150 feet of the exterior boundaries of
the aforedescribed property.121
In 2012, the successor owners of the golf course sought to redevelop it but
were unable to obtain the required consents of the surrounding
homeowners.
When County staff determined that a zoning application could not be
processed until the owners obtained the homeowners’ consents, the owners
filed a quiet title action seeking to, among other claims, invalidate the
zoning covenant under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (“MRTA”).
The owners claimed that the zoning covenant was an “estate or interest in,
or a claim or charge to, title to real property,” and could therefore be
extinguished under MRTA without following the zoning process.122 The
Third District rejected this argument. Instead, the court determined that a
zoning covenant is a form of zoning regulation, not an encumbrance on or
defect that affects the marketability of title to real property, and it is thus
not subject to MRTA.123 Still at issue is whether the covenant remains
enforceable under the analysis conducted in Sunlink and Norwood-Norland.
Consistent with those decisions, the Third District provided a framework
for further analysis in the zoning context; the court noted that “whether
changed circumstances exist to warrant cancellation of the covenant and
whether the covenant constitutes an unlawful restraint on alienation” could
be “addressed as matters preliminary to a proposed re-zoning.”124 Left
unspecified is: whether that determination could be made through a zoning
resolution appealed through the certiorari review process for quasi-judicial
decisions;125 or whether that determination must be made by a trial court in
121

Id.
Id. at 911.
123
Id. at 912. In the 2017 legislative session, the Florida Legislature considered a bill to add
zoning covenants to the list of interests extinguished by MRTA. See H.B. 735, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess.,
(Fla. 2017); S.B. 1046, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). But the bill was not adopted, so the Save
Calusa Trust decision remains the final word on this issue.
124
Save Calusa Trust, 193 So. 3d at 916 n.12.
125
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(2); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089,
1092 (Fla. 2000) (“Although termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but
rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.”); Norwood-Norland
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 511 So. 2d at 1011. But cf. Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 774 So. 2d 14, 19, 20 n.13
(Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that a quasi-judicial board cannot modify the application of the
comprehensive plan to a zoning application on grounds of fundamental fairness––even where the
ordinance governing the comprehensive plan references the need to consider fundamental fairness when
122
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a declaratory action.126
One thing is clear, based on the zoning covenants whose enforceability
was affirmed in Norwood-Norland, Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, and
Sunlink: covenants can lawfully be used to tailor a rezoning to the
surrounding neighborhood. But that method of tailoring comes with
additional complexities. In a straightforward zoning matter, an application
is filed, a hearing is held, interested parties can make their views heard, the
government makes a decision, and an appellate court can review it.
Covenants insert novel ownership and consent issues into that process, by
also subjecting the decision to the consent of interested parties whose
consent might not otherwise be required for rezoning application.127
It would be better for Florida to simply allow conditional rezoning, so
that zoning boards have a greater range of options to address the impacts of
redevelopment and balance the property rights of zoning applicants with the
property rights of neighbors. If conditional rezoning were explicitly
applying the comprehensive plan––because “‘[f]undamental fairness’ questions are judicial ones, within
the jurisdiction of the courts”; and an administrative agency has no power “to determine the illegality or
unconstitutionality of legislation,” namely the comprehensive plan provisions that apply to the
property); Dade Cty. v. Overstreet, 59 So. 2d 862, 865 (Fla. 1952) (“The proposed location of a liquor
store . . . or similar questions under the Statutes or under zoning ordinances or resolutions of a County or
City, should be challenged on the ground that such Statutes, ordinances or resolutions with reference
thereto are illegal or unconstitutional; the same should not and cannot be adjudicated by the Beverage
Director . . . as these are clearly judicial questions for determination by the Circuit Courts under Section
11 of Article V of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.”).
126
See Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 553–56. Declaratory judgment claims seeking to invalidate
the Calusa covenant on grounds of “unlawful restraint on alienation” and of “material change in
circumstance” remain pending in the underlying litigation. Amended Complaint, St. Andrews Holdings,
Ltd. v. Morot-Gaudry, No. 12-33641 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2012).
127 Covenants requiring the consent of neighbors have been repeatedly affirmed and given the
status of local laws, see supra Part III, but no case has specifically addressed the interaction between a
local law that subjects modification or release to the approval of third parties and either the general
prohibition on unlawful delegations of the police power, see supra note 29, or the First Amendment
right “to complain to public officials and to seek administrative and judicial relief from their actions,”
Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F. 3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2002). On the
other hand, Florida courts have consistently affirmed, as complying with due process, zoning regulations
that require zoning approvals to be submitted to the voters in a referendum. See, e.g., Fla. Land Co. v.
City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1983) (“The wisdom of this decision may be
questioned in that all zoning changes made in this fashion are subject to the whims of a referendum and
to the vicissitudes of the electorate. The other side of the coin is that this is a power that the people have
reserved. If the people of Winter Springs choose to give up the power and pass it over solely to a zoning
body, that they may do. But that they have not done, and this Court cannot and will not do it for them.”);
Vill. of Palmetto Bay v. Alexander Sch., Inc., 3D16-1201, 2017 WL 1018495, at *3 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar.
15, 2017) (“Charter provisions such as Section 10.1 that allow some decisions to be made by voter
referendum do not violate due process rights.”). As such, a covenant requiring the approval of neighbors
within a certain radius could be construed as the equivalent of a referendum requirement, albeit of only a
segment of the electorate; cf. Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter, § 7.02 (providing for referendum
on lease or disposition of mini or neighborhood park and requiring affirmative vote by “a majority of the
residents residing in voting precincts any part of which is within 1 mile of the park [to] authorize such
sale or lease by majority vote in an election.”).
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allowed, then, as explained below, the current law governing judicial
review of rezoning decisions would provide sufficient protection against the
arbitrary and capricious use of the police power that had concerned Florida
courts when they limited conditional rezoning.
IV. ZONING DECISIONS AS QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS
Zonings and rezonings were historically the only zoning actions to
have been considered legislative acts. But zoning boards also consider
applications for variances, conditional uses, special exceptions, unusual
uses, and other exceptions, reviews, and interpretations of zoning
ordinances. The Florida Supreme Court had distinguished rezonings from
variances or exceptions as follows: “rezoning ordinarily contemplates a
change in existing zoning rules and regulations within a district, subdivision
or other comparatively large area in a given governmental unit, which
theretofore has been uniformly zoned in its entirety.”128 By contrast, “the
granting of a variance or exception usually contemplates only . . .
permitting a non-conforming use in order to alleviate undue burden or
‘unnecessary hardship’ upon the property owner which the zoning rules and
regulations otherwise impose.”129 And Hartnett further recognized that
flexibility, and hence site-specific conditions, could be appropriate in the
context of applications “appealing to a Board of Adjustment for a variance
on the basis of any hardship” rather than “seeking an outright change in the
zoning ordinance by amendment.”130
These other types of zoning actions––in contrast to zonings and
rezonings––have always been considered “quasi-judicial.”131 A quasijudicial proceeding is an administrative or local board proceeding in which
the board’s action is contingent on notice, an opportunity to be heard, the
presentation of evidence, and a requirement that the board’s judgment be
based on the showing made at the hearing.132 Moreover, unlike legislative
128

Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1951).
Id.
130
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1956); see also J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. City of
Miami, 397 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“Where, however, as here, a party seeks a variance
and not a change or amendment in the zoning ordinance and there is no contracting away of police
power, the deed or contract will be upheld.”).
131
See, e.g., Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 166 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (“In
the instant case the action of the Board of County Commissioners was clearly quasi-judicial because it
was a review of an interpretation and application of an ordinance by the Zoning Appeals Board. The
ordinance in question is valid as applied to the facts of this case.”); Alachua County. v. Eagle’s Nest
Farms, Inc., 473 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Since the special use permit, as defined by the
zoning regulations, is more analogous to a special exception than a rezoning, the denial or issuance of a
special use permit is essentially an administrative function [rather than a legislative function].”).
132
De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957) (en banc) (holding that Civil Service
129
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matters, lobbying of board members on quasi-judicial matters is generally
prohibited for the same reasons that ex parte communications would be
prohibited in a court of law.133
Quasi-judicial actions are distinguished both from purely executive
actions—in which decisions are, with certain exceptions, not subject to a
hearing or to judicial review134—and from legislative actions—which often
involve the establishment of a general policy and which do not require
sworn testimony or evidence or a closed record presented at a hearing.135
These distinctions among executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial functions
are rooted in the Constitutional separation of powers.136 The Florida
Supreme Court has admonished courts to refrain from interfering in the
actions of a co-equal branch of government: “Promiscuous intervention by
the courts in the affairs of these administrative agencies except for most
urgent reasons would inevitably result in the dethronement of the
commissions and the substitution of the courts in their place and stead.”137
The Florida Supreme Court has further pronounced, “Judicial intervention

Board termination proceeding was quasi-judicial).
133
Jennings v. Miami-Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (citations omitted)
(“Ex parte communications are inherently improper and are anathema to quasi-judicial proceedings. . . .
However, we recognize the reality that commissioners are elected officials in which capacity they may
unavoidably be the recipients of unsolicited ex parte communications regarding quasi-judicial matters
they are to decide. The occurrence of such a communication in a quasi-judicial proceeding does not
mandate automatic reversal. Nevertheless, we hold that the allegation of prejudice resulting from ex
parte contacts with the decision makers in a quasi-judicial proceeding states a cause of action. Upon the
aggrieved party’s proof that an ex parte contact occurred, its effect is presumed to be prejudicial unless
the defendant proves the contrary by competent evidence.”). In response to that decision, the Florida
Legislature adopted section 286.0115, Florida Statute, which purports to “remov[e] the presumption of
prejudice from ex parte communications.” No court has directly reviewed that statute, but at least one
court called into doubt the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to
section 286.0115 that purported to remove the presumption of prejudice for ex parte communications.
See Palmer Trinity Private Sch., Inc. v. Vill. of Palmetto Bay, Florida, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (S.D.
Fla. 2011) (noting that a municipal ordinance that “creates a scheme that is directly contrary to the
framework laid out in Jennings. . . . has never been interpreted by Florida courts, and it is unclear if [the
ordinance] stands up to Florida constitutional scrutiny in light of Jennings.”).
134
De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916 (providing an example of non-reviewable, “purely executive”
judgment as removal of an employee from office “where one holds office at the pleasure of the
appointing power and the power of appointment is coupled with the power of removal contingent only
on the exercise of personal judgment by the appointing authority”).
135
See Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); see Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of
Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993).
136
At the local government level, the separation of powers doctrine relates to the relationship
between the local government and the judiciary, not an internal separation of powers within the local
government itself. For counties and municipalities, the constitutional doctrine of a separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of government does not exist. See Citizens for Reform v.
Citizens for Open Gov’t, Inc., 931 So. 2d 977, 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“[T]he concept of
Constitutional separation of powers simply does not exist at the local government level.”) (citations
omitted).
137
Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So. 2d 586, 593 (Fla. 1961).
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in the decision-making function of the executive branch must be restrained
in order to support the integrity of the administrative process and to allow
the executive branch to carry out its responsibilities as a co-equal branch of
government.”138
Appellate review of quasi-judicial decisions respects the separation of
powers, albeit in a different application than the “fairly debatable” standard
that governs review of legislative actions. Quasi-judicial decisions are
reviewed by petition for writ of certiorari. “[T]he reviewing court will not
undertake to re-weigh or evaluate the evidence presented before the tribunal
or agency whose order is under examination.”139 Instead, the appellate court
“merely examines the record below” to determine whether the lower
tribunal provided procedural due process, acted in accord with “the
essential requirements of the law,” and “had before it competent substantial
evidence to support its findings and judgment.”140 “Competent substantial
evidence” means “that the evidence relied upon to sustain the ultimate
finding should be sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind
would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached.”141
Over the years, the Florida Supreme Court clarified the scope of
certiorari review of quasi-judicial local government decisions: “Although
termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather
is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.”142 The
review is plenary in that the court must review the matter and not simply
decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.143 But the court does not
actually decide the underlying merits of the controversy: the court may at
most quash the administrative order and “leave the subject matter, that is,
the controversy pending before the tribunal, commission, or administrative
authority, as if no order or judgment had been entered.”144
Because rezonings were long considered legislative, the only process
that was due was the process attendant to the adoption of ordinances or

138
Key Haven Associated Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Internal Imp. Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d
153, 157 (Fla. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 3d DCA
1973) (citing Odham and reversing trial court that “allowed the plaintiffs to by-pass and interfere with
the orderly administrative proceedings of the ‘Board’” because plaintiffs are required “to exhaust their
administrative remedies before attempting to invoke the scrutiny of the court”).
139
De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000).
143
Id.
144
Tamiami Trail Tours v. R.R. Comm’n, 174 So. 451, 454 (Fla. 1937) (“The appellate court has
no power when exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the
controversy under consideration, nor to direct the respondent to enter any particular order or
judgment.”).
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resolutions generally.145 But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, questions
arose as to the true nature of a rezoning hearing and the procedural and
judicial review standards that should apply to it.146 Finally, in the landmark
ruling of Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, the
Florida Supreme Court resolved the issue. The court decided that rezonings
that
have an impact on a limited number of persons or property
owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where the
decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from
distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the
decision can be functionally viewed as policy application,
rather than policy setting
are considered to be “quasi-judicial action,” and such rezoning actions are
“properly reviewable by petition for certiorari.”147
Furthermore, the courts’ historic concerns for the “uniformity” of a
zoning scheme148 are largely addressed by the statutory requirement that all
local governments adopt a comprehensive plan with a future land use plan

145
But, in Miami-Dade County, rezonings had long been treated as quasi-judicial applications,
based on the County’s unique procedure of taking action on rezonings by resolution rather than by
ordinance. See Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 237 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (“The commission’s
procedure, i.e., utilizing the resolution as a means of denying the request for rezoning, is quasi-judicial
in nature and certiorari was the proper remedy for review of such quasi-judicial proceeding.”) (citing
Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)); Metro. Dade Cty. v. Greenlee, 213 So. 2d 485, 486
(Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (“Such a separate suit would not be appropriate to review the resolution of the
county commission sought there on grounds other than a general challenge of invalidity of the zoning
ordinance.”); Land Corp. of Fla. v. Metro. Dade Cty., 204 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (“The
separate suit filed in this case did not present an attack on the validity of the zoning ordinance, and for
that reason the case of Thompson v. City of Miami, Fla. 1964, 167 So. 2d 841 is not applicable. Here the
challenge was to the county commission’s ruling for which review by certiorari is prescribed by s 33316 of the Code of Ordinances of Metropolitan Dade County.”); Dade Cty. v. Metro Imp. Corp., 190 So.
2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (“Under the provisions of Section 33-315 of the Charter, action taken
by the County Commission sitting as an appellate board for one of the lower echelon zoning authorities
is final action. The Commission may, at its discretion, do three things other than taking final action as
defined in Section 33-315, (1) it may defer action on a matter before it in order to inspect the site in
question; (2) it may refer the matter back to the zoning appeal board for further consideration and
recommendation; (3) it may refer the matter to any department for its recommendation but when Final
action in the nature of rezoning, or a denial of rezoning, is taken by the Board, then the next procedural
step is judicial review.”).
146
See, e.g., Snyder v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty., 595 So. 2d 65, 73 (Fla. 5th DCA
1991) (expressing the view that “rezoning is granted not solely on the basis of the land’s suitability to
the new zoning classification and compatibility with the use of surrounding acreage, but, also, and
perhaps foremost, on local political considerations including who the owner is, who the objectors are,
the particular and exact land improvement and use that is intended to be made and whose ox is being
fattened or gored by the granting or denial of the rezoning request”).
147
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474–75 (Fla. 1993) (quoting
Fifth District Court of Appeal decision).
148
See supra Part I.
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map to address “proposed future general distribution, location, and extent of
the uses of land for residential uses, commercial uses, industry, agriculture,
recreation, conservation, education, public facilities, and other categories of
the public and private uses of land.”149 Comprehensive plans and plan
amendments are legislative decisions (subject to administrative review), but
the statute requires all land development regulations and development orders
to be consistent with the comprehensive plan.150
Unfortunately, the court has not gone further to revisit the precedents it
had established when rezoning was considered to be a legislative act and
did not receive the procedural safeguards of quasi-judicial hearings. But is
now clear that rezoning decisions, like other zoning actions, are held to a
higher due process standard than other local government decisions.151 And
it is clear that zoning decisions that affect discrete parcels or interests are
quasi-judicial and not legislative in character. Accordingly, a clear vehicle
exists for judicial review as to the propriety of rezonings subject to sitespecific conditions.
CONCLUSION
Permitting conditional rezonings outright would give greater options to
local governments in tailoring zoning decisions to surrounding areas
without having to either rewrite their zoning codes or rely on applicants to
proffer restrictive covenants and then deal with the collateral ownership,
modification, and enforceability issues that may arise. The quasi-judicial
zoning hearing process and attendant right to judicial review provide
sufficient protections against arbitrary and capricious rezoning actions.
Moreover, Fontainebleau Gas & Wash enforced the terms of a covenant
that had never actually been recorded; what mattered to the court was that
the terms of the restriction had been expressed on the face of the
resolution.152 Thus, it was constructive notice—not of instruments in the
chain of title—but of zoning regulations on file with the zoning department,
that gave life to that restriction.153 It is time to revisit Hartnett v. Austin’s
149

§ 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat.
§ 163.3194(1), Fla. Stat.
151
See id. at 474 (holding that a local government decision that “determines the rules of law
applicable, and the rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions” is a quasi-judicial decision;
“legislative action results in the formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial action results in
the application of a general rule of policy.”); Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1340.
152
Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“A preamble
to the zoning resolution clearly expressed that the county commission granted rezoning only for a bank
or savings and loan and accepted the property owner’s offer of a restrictive covenant and the county’s
option to enforce this restriction. No such restrictive covenant was ever recorded.”).
153
Id. at 1007–08.
150
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emphasis on a uniform Euclidean system and to fully embrace conditional
rezoning.

